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ABSTRACT
Unconditionally secure bit commitment and coin flipping are
known to be impossible in the classical world. Bit commit-
ment is known to be impossible also in the quantum world.
We introduce a related new primitive - quantum bit escrow.
In this primitive Alice commits to a bit b to Bob. The com-
mitment is binding in the sense that if Alice is asked to reveal
the bit, Alice can not bias her commitment without having
a good probability of being detected cheating. The commit-
ment is sealing in the sense that if Bob learns information
about the encoded bit, then if later on he is asked to prove
he was playing honestly, he is detected cheating with a good
probability. Rigorously proving the correctness of quantum
cryptographic protocols has proved to be a difficult task. We
develop techniques to prove quantitative statements about
the binding and sealing properties of the quantum bit escrow
protocol.
A related primitive we construct is a quantum biased coin
flipping protocol where no player can control the game, i.e.,
even an all-powerful cheating player must lose with some
constant probability, which stands in sharp contrast to the
classical world where such protocols are impossible.
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1. INTRODUCTION
We start with an informal definition of a (very) weak variant
of bit commitment. In this variant there is first a commit-
ment stage in which Alice commits a bit b to Bob. Later
on there is a reveal stage in which Alice reveals the bit and
Bob proves he played honestly. The protocol should be bind-
ing in the sense that if Alice changes her mind at revealing
time then Bob has a good probability of catching her cheat-
ing, and sealing in the sense that if Bob learns information
about the committed bit then Alice has a good probability
of catching him cheating. Thus, the fundamental (and only)
difference between this primitive and bit commitment is that
in bit commitment Bob can not learn from the encoding any
information about b, while in the weak primitive Bob can
learn a lot of information about the encoded bit, but if he
does so Alice catches him cheating with a good probability.
Definition 1. (Weak bit commitment) A weak bit com-
mitment protocol is a quantum communication protocol be-
tween Alice and Bob which consists of two stages, the de-
positing stage and the revealing stage, and a final classical
declaration stage at which both Alice and Bob each declare
“accept” or “reject”. The following requirements should
hold.
• If both Alice and Bob are honest, then at depositing
stage Alice decides on a bit, b. She then communicates
with Bob, where Alice’s protocol depends on b. At re-
vealing stage Alice and Bob communicate, and during
this stage Alice reveals to Bob the deposited bit b. Both
Alice and Bob accept.
• (Binding) If Alice tries to change her mind about the
value of b, then there is non zero probability that an
honest Bob would reject.
• (Sealing) If Bob attempts to learn information about
the deposited bit b, then there is non zero probability
that an honest Alice would reject.
Later on, we will give more formal definitions of “Alice
changing her mind” and “Bob learning information”, and
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Figure 1: φb,x
we will quantify the degree to which a protocol is binding
or sealing.
Now, consider the following protocol:
Protocol 1. (Bit Escrow) For an angle α ∈ [−π, π] de-
fine φα = cos(α)|0〉 + sin(α)|1〉. Let,
φb,x =


φ−θ b = 0, x = 0
φθ b = 0, x = 1
φpi
2
−θ b = 1, x = 0
φpi
2
+θ b = 1, x = 1
for some fixed angle θ ≤ π
8
, say, θ = π
8
. See Figure 1.
To deposit bit b, Alice picks a random x ∈ {0, 1}, and sends
φb,x to Bob. Later on, one of the following two challenges
is issued:
• Either Alice is asked to reveal the deposited bit, and
then Alice sends the classical bits b and x to Bob 1.
Bob measures φ according to the basis {φ0,x, φ1,x} and
verifies that the result of the measurement is φb,x.
• Or Bob is asked to return the deposited qubit, he
returns a qubit q, and Alice measures it in the
{φ0,x, φ1,x} basis and verifies that it is φb,x.
We rigorously define and prove:
Theorem 1. Protocol 1 has the following properties:
• The deposited qubit does not reveal, in an information
theoretic sense, all the information about the deposited
bit b.
• (Binding) When Bob asks Alice to reveal the classical
bit b that she deposited, if Alice influences the value of
b with advantage ǫ then she is detected cheating with
probability Ω(ǫ2).
• (Sealing) When Alice challenges Bob to return the de-
posited qubit, then if Bob can predict b with advantage
ǫ then he is detected cheating with probability Ω(ǫ2).
Protocol 1 and Theorem 1 do not achieve the goal set in
definition 1 of weak bit commitment. Definition 1 asks for
a protocol that is both binding and sealing, i.e., a commit-
ment s.t. if either player cheats he is detected cheating with
a good probability. Protocol 1 and Theorem 1 only give a
commitment that is either binding (if Alice has to reveal) or
1 This means that when Bob gets the qubit qb that is sup-
posed to carry a classical value for b, Bob measures qb first
in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis. We carry this convention throughout
the paper.
sealing (if Bob has to return the qubit), but not simultane-
ously both. We therefore call this protocol a bit escrow pro-
tocol. The question of achieving simultaneous binding and
sealing i.e. a weak bit commitment protocol, is left open.
This question was addressed in [3], who independently de-
fined the binding and sealing properties, and we discuss it
in section 1.2.
We describe soon how to use the first two properties in The-
orem 1 to get a biased coin flipping protocol with a constant
bias.
1.1 Quantum Coin flipping
Alice and Bob are going through a divorce. They want to
decide by a coin flip over the phone who is going to keep the
car. The problem is that they do not trust each other any
more.
Definition 2. (Classical coin flipping) [2] A coin flip-
ping protocol with δ bias is one where Alice and Bob com-
municate and finally decide on a value c ∈ {0, 1} s.t. if at
least one of the players is honest then for any strategy of the
dishonest player Prob(c = 0) ∈ [ 1
2
− δ, 1
2
+ δ].
Classical coin flipping can be implemented either by a
trusted party or by assuming players with limited compu-
tational power and some cryptographic assumptions. How-
ever, if the players have unlimited computational power then
no coin flipping protocol is possible in a classical world. This
is because any protocol represents a two player game, and
therefore game theory tells us that there is a player with an
always winning strategy.
By contrast, in the quantum setting coin flipping (without
computational assumptions) is not a priori ruled out. This is
because any attempt by a player to measure extra informa-
tion by deviating from the protocol can disturb the quantum
state, and therefore be detected by the other player. This
leads Lo and Chau[5] and later Mayers et. al.[7] to consider
quantum coin flipping. There are several ways to define
quantum coin flipping when cheaters can be detected. We
define:
Definition 3. (quantum coin flipping) A quantum coin
flipping protocol with bias δ is one where Alice and Bob com-
municate and finally each decides on a value c ∈ {0, 1, err}.
Let cA (cB) denote Alice’s (Bob’s) result. We require:
• If both players are honest then cA always equals cB,
Prob(cA = err) = 0, and 0 and 1 have equal probabil-
ity: Prob(cA = 0) = Prob(cA = 1) =
1
2
.
• If one of the players is honest and the other is not,
then for any strategy of the dishonest player, the honest
player’s result c satisfies for any b ∈ {0, 1}:
Prob(c = b) ≤ 1
2
+ δ
Lo and Chau [5] showed that there is no quantum coin flip-
ping protocol with 0 bias, under a certain restriction (“ideal
coin flipping”.) Mayers et al [7] generalized their proof to
the general 0 bias case. Lo and Chau leave open the ques-
tion whether non-exact protocols exist. Mayers et al [7]
suggest a quantum coin flipping protocol that is based on a
biased-coin protocol that is repeated many times. Mayers
et al prove that it works well against some strong, natural
attacks. However, no general proof is given or claimed for
the coin-flipping protocol or the biased-coin sub-protocol.
We give a simple protocol for quantum biased coin flipping,
with constant bias. It is a modification of protocol 1:
Protocol 2. (A biased coin flipping protocol)
• Alice picks b, x ∈R {0, 1} and sends Bob φb,x. We set
θ = π
8
.
• Bob chooses b′ ∈R {0, 1} and sends it to Alice.
• Alice sends Bob b and x. Bob checks against the qubit
she sent in the first step. The result of the game is
r = err if Alice is caught cheating and r = b ⊕ b′
otherwise.
Based on the properties of protocol 1 we can prove that no
player can fully control the game:
Theorem 2. Protocol 2 has δ ≤ 0.42 bias.
i.e., no player can force his result with probability greater
than 0.92. We note that while our protocol is resilient
against all powerful malicious quantum players, it requires
only simple single qubit operations from the honest player.
An intriguing question is whether quantum coin flipping pro-
tocols are possible for arbitrarily low biases.
1.2 Weak Bit Commitment?
Hardy and Kent [3] (see Section 1.3) noticed that Protocol 1
can be used to give a weak bit commitment protocol if Alice
and Bob can access a random independent coin flip. This
is done as follows: at revealing time Alice first reveals the
bit b, and then they receive a random independent coin flip.
If the coin is 0, Bob is challenged to convince Alice that he
hasn’t been cheating, and if the coin flip turns out to be 1,
then Alice is challenged. This is still correct if the coin flip
is biased, as long as both probabilities for 0 and for 1 are
constant.
Since we already have a biased coin flipping protocol, we
might consider using this biased coin flipping protocol com-
bined with the bit escrow protocol to give a weak bit com-
mitment protocol. Consider the following protocol (see Fig-
ure 2):
Protocol 3. To deposit bit b, Alice picks a random
x ∈ {0, 1}, and sends φ = φb,x to Bob. To reveal the bit,
Alice sends b to Bob. Then a biased-coin flipping protocol
(Protocol 2) is played.
• If Alice loses she is asked to reveal x and Bob measures
φ according to the basis {φ0,x, φ1,x} and verifies that
the result of the measurement is φb,x.
• If Bob loses he is asked to return the deposited qubit
q, and Alice measures it in the {φ0,x, φ1,x} basis and
verifies that it is φb,x.
It is left as an open question whether this protocol, or per-
haps a protocol which uses a different coin flipping proce-
dure, is actually a weak bit commitment protocol. The main
difficulty in proving or disproving such a result is the issue of
independence between the coin flipping protocol and the bit
escrow protocol. In other words, one has to prove that the
cheater cannot use entanglement to correlate the events of
Alice Bob
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Figure 2: Protocol 3
being detected cheating in the bit-escrow protocol and win-
ning the biased coin flipping protocol, in such a way that
the cheater is never challenged when he (or she) has posi-
tive probability of being detected.
It is our hope that our techniques could be extended to
give weak bit commitment with Ω(ǫc) binding and sealing
for some constant c. Our results also show that Protocol 3
cannot be more than Ω(ǫ2) sealing or binding. It might be
interesting to find a protocol that does better, or prove that
such a protocol does not exist. It seems that a weak bit
commitment protocol with better than quadratic security
parameters can be used repeatedly to give a secure coin
flipping protocol with unbounded bias.
1.3 Related Work
Some of the work presented here was independently done by
Hardy and Kent [3]. They independently defined the bind-
ing and sealing properties and the weak bit commitment
primitive (giving it different names). The protocol they an-
alyze is similar in structure to protocol 3. Hardy and Kent’s
result asserts that a protocol similar to Protocol 3 is simul-
taneously sealing and binding. I.e., if Alice (Bob) uses a
strategy that gives her (him) ǫ advantage, then Alice (Bob)
is detected cheating with some probability which is strictly
greater than 0 (they do not analyze the dependence of the
detection probability on ǫ). However, no proof is given re-
garding the security against a cheater who tries to correlate
the two parts of the protocol to his (or her) advantage.
2. PRELIMINARIES
The model. Let {e1, . . . , e2n} be an orthonormal basis for
Cn, and let |i〉 = |i1, . . . , in〉 be the vector ei. A pure state
over n qubits is a vector v ∈ C2n of norm 1. Any pure
state |v〉 can be expressed as |v〉 = Σiai|i〉, with Σi|ai|2 = 1.
A mixed state is a classical distribution over pure states,
{pi, φi}, where 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1, Σipi = 1 and φi is a pure state,
and the interpretation we give it is that the system is with
probability pi in the pure state φi. A quantum system is,
in general, in a mixed state. The system Alice builds in
the first stage of Protocol 2 is in a mixed state that is with
probability 1
4
in some pure state φb,x.
A quantum system can undergo two basic operations: uni-
tary evolution and measurement.
Unitary evolution : If a unitary transformation U :
C2
n 7→ C2n is applied to a pure state φ, then the
new state of the system is the pure state Uφ. If U is
applied to the mixture {pi, φi} then the new state of
the system is the mixture {pi, Uφi}. The interpreta-
tion we give it is that with probability pi the system
was in the pure state φi hence it is now in the pure
state Uφi.
Orthogonal Measurements : An orthogonal measure-
ment is a decomposition of the system into orthogo-
nal subspaces. More formally, suppose the system is
in a super position φ ∈ C2n . Suppose H1, . . . ,Hk
are orthogonal subspaces, and C2
n
= H1 ⊕ . . .⊕Hk.
A measurement of φ according to the decomposition
H1, . . . ,Hk, will get result i (or Hi) with proba-
bility qi = |ΠHi |φ〉|2 where ΠHi is the projection
on subspace Hi, and then the state will collapse to
1√
qi
ΠHi |φ〉. In other words, φ falls into the subspace
Hi with probability which is the length of the projec-
tion squared, and the new vector is the normalized
projected vector. An orthogonal measurement can
be represented using an Hermitian matrix M whose
eigenspaces are the subspaces Hi. A measurement of
a mixture is the mixture of the measurements of the
pure states.
Given a system ρ on C2
n
, one can use an ancilla, say
|0, . . . , 0〉 ∈ C2m , apply a unitary transformation U :
C2
n ⊗ C2m 7→ C2n ⊗ C2m , and then an orthogonal mea-
surement on C2
n ⊗ C2m . It turns out that this is the most
general measurement possible. There are several equivalent
ways to formulate this so called ’generalized measurement’,
and we refer the interested reader to [8].
The Density Matrix. The density matrix of a pure state
|φ〉 is the matrix |φ〉〈φ|, where 〈φ| = ((φ)t)∗ is the conjugate
transpose of φ. For example, the density matrix of φ0,0 is
|φ−θ〉〈φ−θ| =
(
cos2(θ) − cos(θ) sin(θ)
− cos(θ) sin(θ) sin2(θ)
)
The density matrix of a mixed state {pi, φi} is Σipi|φi〉〈φi|.
All density matrices are Hermitian, positive semi-definite
and have trace 1. If a unitary matrix U operates on the
system, it transforms the density matrix ρ to UρU†. A mea-
surement M operating on a system whose density matrix is
ρ results in an expected outcome Trace(Mρ).
Distinguishing Between Density Matrices. Given a
quantum system ρ and a generalized measurement O on
it, let ρO denote the classical distribution on the possible
results that we get by measuring ρ according to O. i.e., it is
some classical distribution p1, . . . , pk where we get result i
with probability pi. Given two different mixed states, we can
ask how well one can distinguish between the two mixtures.
We need a measure for the distance between two classical
distributions and we choose the l1 norm:
Definition 4. Let p1, . . . , pk and q1, . . . , qk be two prob-
ability distributions over {1, . . . , k}. Then |p−q|1 = Σi|pi−
qi|.
A fundamental theorem about distinguishing density matri-
ces[1] tells us:
Theorem 3. [1] Let ρ1, ρ2 be two density matrices on the
same space H. Then for any generalized measurement O
|ρO1 − ρO2 |1 ≤ Trace(
√
A†A)
where A = ρ1 − ρ2. Furthermore, the bound is tight, and
the orthogonal measurement O that projects a state on the
eigenvectors of ρ1 − ρ2 achieves this bound.
Theorem 3 shows that the density matrix captures all the
accessible information that a quantum state contains. If
two different mixtures have the same density matrix (which
is quite possible) then physically they are two different sys-
tems, but practically (and from a computational point of
view) they are indistinguishable.
The quantity Trace(
√
A†A) is of independent interest. If
we define ||A||t = Trace(
√
A†A) then ||·||t defines a norm,
and has some additional properties such as ||A⊗B||t =
||A||t · ||B||t, ||A||t = 1 for any density matrix A and
||AB||t, ||BA||t ≤ ||A||t · ||B||t. If φ1, φ2 are two pure
states, and ρi is the reduced density matrix of φi, then
||ρ0 − ρ1||t = 2
√
1− |〈φ1|φ2〉|2. See [1] for more details.
Locality. We now turn to the local view of a subsystem.
Suppose we are in a mixed state ρ over k+m qubits, where
Alice holds the first k qubits A and Bob holds the last m
qubits B. Assume that Alice applies a generalized measure-
ment O on her qubits A. This induces a new density matrix
ρOB on B. E.g., if Alice and Bob were in the super position
φ = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) over two qubits and Alice measured the
second qubit according to the basis {|0〉, |1〉}, then Bob is
with probability 1
2
in the super position |0〉 and with prob-
ability 1
2
in |1〉, hence ρOB =
(
1
2
0
0 1
2
)
. A fundamental
fact from physics, which can also be proven rigorously, tells
us that in fact ρOB does not depend on O, but only on the
original matrix ρ. We thus denote it by ρ|B , and call it the
density matrix ρ reduced onto the subsystem B. Alterna-
tively, we say that the rest of the system is traced out. The
physical interpretation of the above result is that a player is
guaranteed locality, i.e., a player Bob who holds a subsys-
tem B knows that the results he gets from measurements he
applies on B do not depend on the way the system outside
B evolves. It is also some kind of commitment. If Alice
sends Bob k qubits that have reduced density matrix ρB,
then whatever Alice later does can not change this reduced
density matrix.
Purification. A density matrix on a Hilbert space A can
always be viewed as a reduced density matrix of a pure state
on a larger Hilbert space, a process which is called “purifi-
cation”. A pure state |φ〉A,B is a purification of the density
matrix ρA if the reduced density matrix of |φ〉〈φ|A,B to the
Hilbert space A is ρ. The most straight forward way to
purify a density matrix ρ =
∑
i wi|φi〉〈φi| is by the state
|φ〉 =∑i√wi|i〉 ⊗ |φi〉.
Fidelity.
The fidelity is a way to measure distances between density
matrices, which is an alternative to the trace metric. Given
two density matrices ρ0, ρ1 on the same Hilbert space A the
fidelity is defined [4] to be:
f(ρ0, ρ1) = sup |〈φ0|φ1〉|2 (1)
where the supremum is taken over all purifications |φ0〉 of ρ0
and |φ1〉 of ρ1 to the same dimensional Hilbert space. We
note here a few important properties which can easily be
proven:
1. 0 ≤ f(ρ0, ρ1) ≤ 1
2. f(ρ0, ρ1) = 1⇐⇒ ρ0 = ρ1
3. For ρ0 which is a pure state, i.e. ρ0 = |φ0〉〈φ0|, we
have
f(ρ0, ρ1) = 〈φ0|ρ1|φ0〉.
Note that the fidelity increases as the distance between two
density matrices decreases. It is also not too difficult to see
that the supremum is always achieved, i.e. we can replace
the supremum by a maximum; See [4] for more details.
Entanglement. Suppose Alice holds a register A, Bob
holds B, and the system is in a pure state ψAB . If we look
at Bob’s system alone then we might see a mixed state, and
as we said before, Alice can not change the reduced density
matrix of Bob by local operations on her side. On the other
hand Alice might gain different aspects of knowledge on the
actual result that Bob gets.
Example 1. ψAB =
1√
2
(|00〉+|11〉). If Alice measures in
the {|0〉, |1〉} basis, then Bob’s system is with probability half
in the state |0〉, and with probability half in the state |1〉, and
the register A reflects the result Bob gets, i.e., Alice knows
whether Bob gets a zero or a one. Now, ψAB can also be rep-
resented as 1√
2
(|+,+〉 + |−,−〉) where |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉)
and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). Alice can measure the register A
in the {|+〉, |−〉} basis. Now Bob’s system is with probabil-
ity 1
2
in the state |+〉, and with probability half in the state
|−〉, and the register A reflects the result Bob gets, i.e., Al-
ice knows whether Bob gets |+〉 or |−〉. Notice that Bob’s
reduced density matrix is the same in both cases.
An important Theorem by Mayers [6] and independently Lo
and Chau [5] states:
Theorem 4. Suppose the reduced density matrix of B is
the same in φAB and ψAB. Then Alice can move from φAB
to ψAB by applying a local transformation on her side.
I.e., even though Alice can not change Bob’s reduced density
matrix, she can determine how to “open” the mixture, and
do so in a way that gives her full knowledge of Bob’s result.
3. THE BINDING PROPERTY
In Protocol 1 Alice sends a qubit to Bob (we call it a “de-
posit” step) and later on she tells Bob how to “open” the
qubit (the “reveal” step) which also determines the value
that is supposed to be in the qubit. Such a protocol is
worthless unless the deposit step is “binding” Alice to a
pre-determined value. We first define the binding property
in a general way. We then analyze how binding Protocol 1
is. Suppose we have a two step protocol:
Deposit : Alice prepares a super-position ψAB with two
quantum registers A and B. Alice sends the second
register B to Bob.
Reveal : Alice and Bob communicate. Bob follows the
protocol and Alice is arbitrary. If Alice wants to create
a bias towards 0 she uses one strategy, and if she wants
a bias towards 1 she uses a different strategy. Bob
decides on a result rB ∈ {0, 1, err}.
Let us denote by p0 the probability that Alice claims the re-
sult is 0 in the zero strategy, by p1 the probability that Alice
claims the result is 1 in the zero strategy, and by perr the
probability that Bob decides the answer is rB = err when
Alice uses the zero strategy. We similarly define q0, q1, qerr
for the one strategy.
Definition 5. ((ǫ, γ) binding) A protocol is (ǫ, γ) bind-
ing, if whenever Bob is honest, for any strategy Alice uses,
if perr, qerr ≤ ǫ then |p0 − q0|, |p1 − q1| ≤ γ.
3.1 Protocol 1 is quadratically binding
Theorem 5. Protocol 1 is (ǫ, γ = 2
√
ǫ
cos(2θ)
) binding.
Proof. (of Theorem 5). At deposit time Alice sends Bob
one qubit B, which might be entangled with the qubits A
that Alice holds. Let us denote the reduced density matrix
of B by ρ. At revealing time, Alice may choose whether
she wants to bias the result towards 0, in which case she
applies the generalized measurement M0, or towards 1 in
which case she applies M1. The measurements M0 and M1
do not change the reduced density matrix ρ of Bob, but
rather give different ways to realize ρ as a mixture of pure-
states, and give Alice information about the value that Bob
actually gets to see in this mixture.
Now, we even go further and give Alice complete freedom to
choose the way she realizes the reduced density matrix ρ of
Bob as a mixture, and we give her the knowledge of Bob’s
value for free. Let us say that when Alice applies M0, the
reduced density matrix ρ is realized as the mixture {pi, φi},
and when Alice applies M1 the reduced density matrix ρ is
realized as the mixture {p′i, φ′i}.
Now, let us focus on the zero strategy. Say Alice realizes ρ
as {pi, φi}. When the i’th event happens, Alice’s strategy
tells her to send some two qubits qb, qx to Bob, that are
supposed to hold classical 0, 1 values for b and x. Bob then
measures qb and qx in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis. Now, if one of
qb, qx is not a classical bit, then Alice can measure it herself
in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis, and get a mixture over classical bits.
Furthermore, we can push all the probabilistic decisions into
the mixture {pi, φi}. Thus, w.l.o.g, we can assume Alice’s
answers qb and qx are classical bits that are determined by
the event i. Let us denote by ui the vector φbi,xi where bi, xi
are Alice’s answers when event i occurs. W.l.o.g we may
assume ui ∈ {φb,x}, otherwise we know Bob immediately
rejects.
The probability Bob discovers that Alice is cheating is then
1 − |〈φi|ui〉|2 and the overall probability Bob detects Alice
is cheating is
perr = Σipi(1− |〈φi|ui〉|2)
Let us define the density matrix ρ0 = Σipi|ui〉〈ui|.
Claim 6. ||ρ − ρ0||t ≤ 2√perr.
Proof. |||φi〉〈φi| − |ui〉〈ui|||t = 2
√
1− |〈φi|ui〉|2.
Therefore
||ρ− ρ0||t = ||Σipi|φi〉〈φi| − Σipi|ui〉〈ui| ||t
≤ Σipi|||φi〉〈φi| − |ui〉〈ui| ||t
= 2Σipi
√
1− |〈φi|ui〉|2
Now, by Cauchy-Schwartz inequality,
Σipi
√
1− |〈φi|ui〉|2 = Σi√pi
√
pi(1− |〈φi|ui〉|2)
≤
√
Σipi
√
Σipi(1− |〈φi|ui〉|2)
=
√
perr
and the claim follows.
Similarly, if Alice tries to bias the result towards 1, B
ends up in the mixture {p′i, φ′i}, and when φ′i occurs Al-
ice sends b′, x′ to Bob that correspond to a vector u′i ∈
{φb,x}. We define ρ1 to be the reduced density matrix
ρ1 = Σip
′
i|u′i〉〈u′i|. As before, ||ρ− ρ1||t ≤ 2√qerr. Hence,
||ρ0 − ρ1||t ≤ 2(√perr +√qerr).
To conclude the proof, we establish the following claim:
Claim 7. Let ρ0 and ρ1 be density matrices correspond-
ing to mixtures over {φb,x}. Let p0 be the probability of
φ0,0 or φ0,1 in the first mixture, and p1 = 1 − p0 be
the probability of φ1,0 or φ1,1. Similarly let q0 and q1 be
the corresponding quantities for the second mixture. Then
||ρ0 − ρ1||t ≥ 2 · |p0 − q0| cos 2θ.
Proof. We show that we can distinguish the mixtures
with probability at least |p0 − q0| cos 2θ when we measure
them according to the basis {|0〉, |1〉}. If we do the measure-
ment on a qubit whose state is the reduced density matrix ρ0
we get the |0〉 answer with probability p0 cos2(θ)+p1 sin2(θ),
while if we do the measurement on a qubit whose state is the
reduced density matrix ρ1 we get the |0〉 answer with prob-
ability q0 cos
2(θ)+ q1 sin
2(θ). The difference is |p0 cos2(θ)+
p1 sin
2(θ) − (q0 cos2(θ) + q1 sin2(θ))| = |p0 − q0|(cos2(θ) −
sin2(θ)), where we used p1−q1 = (1−p0)−(1−q0) = q0−p0.
Altogether we get ||ρ0 − ρ1||t ≥ 2·|p0−q0|(cos2(θ)−sin2(θ))
as desired.
Putting it together:
2·cos(2θ)·|p0−q0| ≤ ||ρ1 − ρ1||t ≤ 2(√perr+√qerr) ≤ 4
√
ǫ
I.e., |p0 − q0| ≤ 2
√
ǫ
cos(2θ)
.
3.2 A Quadratic Strategy for Alice
We now show that Alice has a quadratic strategy for Pro-
tocol 1, and thus Theorem 5 is essentially tight. In fact,
we show the quadratic bound for a more general family of
protocols. Let ρ0, ρ1 be two density matrices of the same
dimension, ρ0 can be realized as the mixture {p0i , |α0i 〉}, and
ρ1 as {p1i , |α1i 〉}. To encode b, honest Alice picks |αbi 〉 with
probability pi and sends it to Bob. At revealing time Al-
ice sends b and i to Bob, and Bob tests whether Alice is
cheating by projecting his state on |αbi 〉.
Theorem 8. Let f be the fidelity f(ρ0, ρ1). For any
0 ≤ α ≤ π/4 there exists a strategy for Alice with ad-
vantage
√
fsin(2α)/2 and probability of detection at most
(1−f)sin2(α)
2
.
On first reading of the next proof the reader might want to
check the proof in the simpler case where ρ0 and ρ1 represent
pure states, i.e., ρb = |ψb〉〈ψb|.
Proof. We first represent the strategy of a honest Al-
ice in quantum language. Consider two maximally paral-
lel purifications |ψ0〉 and |ψ1〉 of ρ0 and ρ1, where ρ0 and
ρ1 are density matrices of the register B, and the purifica-
tions are states on a larger Hilbert space A ⊗ B. By [4],
|〈ψ0|ψ1〉|2 = f(ρ0, ρ1). At preparation time, Alice prepares
the state
|β〉 = 1√
2
(|0, ψ0〉+ |1, ψ1〉)
on A⊗B and one extra qubit C. Alice then sends the register
B to Bob. At revealing time, Alice measures the qubit C in
the |0〉, |1〉 basis, to get a bit b. The state of registers A,B
is now |ψb〉. Alice then applies a unitary transformation Ub
on register A, which rotates her state |ψb〉 to the state
|ψ′b〉 =
∑
j
√
pbj |j〉A|αbj〉B
This is possible by Theorem 4. After applying Ub, Alice
measures register A in the computational basis and sends
Bob the bit b and the outcome of the second measurement,
j. This strategy is similar to the honest strategy, except for
that Alice does not know what bit and state is sent until
revealing time.
We can also assume w.l.o.g. that the maximally parallel
purifications satisfy that 〈ψ0|ψ1〉 is real and positive. This
can be assumed since otherwise we could multiply |ψ0〉 by an
overall phase without changing the reduced density matrix
and the absolute value of the inner product.
To cheat, Alice creates the encoding |β〉CAB and sends regis-
ter B to Bob. Alice’s one strategy is also as described above.
The zero strategy, on the other hand, is a slight modification
of the honest strategy. At revealing time, Alice measures the
control qubit C in the {|φα〉, |φ⊥α 〉} basis, where
|φα〉 = c|0〉 + s|1〉, (2)
|φ⊥α 〉 = −s|0〉+ c|1〉,
and s = sin(α), c = cos(α). If the outcome is a projection on
|φα〉 Alice sends b = 0 and proceeds according to the b = 0
honest protocol, i.e. applies U0 to register A, measures in
the computational basis and sends the result to Bob. If the
outcome is a projection on |φ⊥α 〉, Alice proceeds according
to the b = 1 honest protocol. Let us now compute Alice’s
advantage and Alice’s probability of getting caught cheating.
We can express |β〉 as:
|β〉 = 1√
2
(c|φα, ψ0〉 − s|φ⊥α , ψ0〉) +
1√
2
(s|φα, ψ1〉+ c|φ⊥α , ψ1〉).
Hence, the probability Alice sends b = 0 in the zero strategy
is 1
2
|cψ0 + sψ1|2 = 12 (c2 + s2 +2cs〈ψ0|ψ1〉) = 12 (1 + 2cs
√
f).
We conclude:
Claim 9. Alice’s advantage is
√
f sin(2α)
2
.
We now prove that the detection probability is at most
(1−f)s2. The state of A⊗B conditioned that the first mea-
surement yields |φα〉 can be written as 1√
Pr(b=0)
1√
2
(c|ψ0〉+
s|ψ1〉) where Pr(b = 0) is the probability Alice sends b = 0
in the zero strategy. The above state can be written as
1√
Pr(b = 0)
1√
2
(c+
√
fs)|ψ0〉+
√
1− fs|ψ⊥0 〉
The rest of the protocol involves Alice’s rotation of the state
by U0, then Alice’s measurement of the register A and Bob’s
measurement of the register B. The entire process can be
treated as a generalized measurement on this state, where
this measurement is a projection onto one of two subspaces,
the “cheating Alice” and the “Honest Alice” subspaces. We
know that |ψ0〉 lies entirely in the honest Alice subspace,
and thus the probability that Alice is caught, conditioned
that C was projected on φα, is at most
1
Pr(b=0)
1
2
(1− f)s2.
In the same way, when we condition on a projection on φ⊥α ,
Alice’s state can be written as 1√
Pr(b=1)
1√
2
((c−√fs)|ψ1〉−
√
1− fs|ψ⊥1 〉). which gives a probability of detection which
is at most 1
Pr(b=1)
1
2
(1− f)s2. Adding the conditional prob-
abilities together we get that the detection probability is at
most (1−f)s
2
2
.
4. THE SEALING PROPERTY
Definition 6. ((ǫ, p) sealing) A bit escrow protocol is
(ǫ, p) sealing, if whenever Alice is honest and deposits a bit b
s.t. Prob(b = 0) = 1
2
, for any strategy Bob uses and a value
c Bob learns, it holds that either
• Prb∈R{0,1},protocol (c = b) ≤ 12 + ǫ, or
• Prb∈R{0,1},protocol (rA = err) ≥ p
The probability is taken over b taken uniformly from {0, 1}
and the protocol.
We show here that protocol 1 is quadratically sealing. This
means that whatever Bob does, he will always be detected
cheating with probability which is at least the square of his
advantage. Later, we show that this is tight.
4.1 Protocol 1 is Quadratically Sealing
Theorem 10. Protocol 1 is (ǫ = O(
√
p
sin(2θ)
), p) sealing.
Proof. We first describe a general scenario. Alice is hon-
est and sends |φb,x〉A to Bob. Bob has an ancilla |0〉C . Bob
applies some unitary transformation U acting on the regis-
ters A and C. Let us denote
|αb,x〉 = U(|φb,x, 0〉AC)
Bob then sends register A to Alice, and keeps register C to
himself. We want to show that if C contains much informa-
tion about b then Alice detects Bob cheating with a good
probability.
We can express αb,x as a superposition,
|αb,x〉 = |φb,x, wb,x〉+ |φ¬b,x, w′b,x〉 (3)
where we have used the basis |φb,x〉, |φ¬b,x〉, for A. In this
representation, the probability p Bob is caught cheating is:
p =
1
4
∑
b,x
||w′b,x||2 (4)
which in particular implies that ||w′b,x|| ≤ 2√p.
We now want to express Bob’s advantage. Let ρ0 (ρ1) be
the reduced density matrix of the register B conditioned on
the event that b = 0 (b = 1). Then,
ρb =
∑
x
Pr(x)(|wb,x〉〈wb,x|+ |w′b,x〉〈w′b,x|) (5)
Bob’s advantage is at most the trace dis-
tance between ρ0 and ρ1, and we want to
bound it from above. Triangle inequality gives:
||ρ0 − ρ1||t ≤ 12 ( |||w0,0〉〈w0,0| − |w1,1〉〈w1,1|||t +|||w0,1〉〈w0,1| − |w1,0〉〈w1,0|||t +
∑
b,x ||w′b,x〉〈w′b,x|||t ).
As the trace norm of two pure states a and b is
2
√
1− |〈a|b〉|2, and using Equation 4, we get:
||ρ0 − ρ1||t ≤
√
1− |〈w0,0|w1,1〉|2 +√
1− |〈w0,1|w1,0〉|2 + 2p
We now claim;
Lemma 11. |〈w0,0|w1,1〉| , |〈w0,1|w1,0〉| ≥ 1 −
O(ctg2(2θ) + 4)p.
Thus, altogether, ||ρ0 − ρ1||t ≤ O(ctg(2θ)√p) which com-
pletes the proof.
We now turn to the proof of Lemma 11.
Proof. (of Lemma).
We will prove that all the unprimed w vectors lie in one
bunch of small width, using the unitarity of U . The unitar-
ity of U implies that 〈φb,x|φb′,x′〉 = 〈αb,x|αb′ ,x′〉. We can
express αb,x as in Equation 3. We get:
〈φb,x|φb′,x′〉 = 〈φb,x|φb′,x′〉〈wb,x|wb′,x′〉+
〈φb,x|φ¬b′,x′〉〈wb,x|w′b′,x′〉+
〈φ¬b,x|φb′,x′〉〈w′b,x|wb′,x′〉+
〈φ¬b,x|φ¬b′,x′〉〈w′b,x|w′b′,x′〉
Substituting the values b, x, b′, x′ for actual values, and
noticing that |〈w′b,x|w′b′ ,x′〉| ≤ 4p, we in particular get the
following equations:
〈wb,x|wb,x〉 =4p 1 (6)
〈w0,0|w′1,0〉+ 〈w′0,0|w1,0〉 = 0 (7)
〈w0,1|w′1,1〉+ 〈w′0,1|w1,1〉 = 0 (8)
〈w1,0|w′1,1〉 − 〈w′1,0|w1,1〉 =4cp/s c
s
(1− 〈w1,0|w1,1〉) (9)
〈w0,1|w′1,0〉+ 〈w′0,1|w1,0〉 =4sp/c sc (1− 〈w0,1|w1,0〉) (10)
− 〈w0,0|w′1,1〉 − 〈w′0,0|w1,1〉 =4sp/c s
c
(1− 〈w0,0|w1,1〉) (11)
〈w′0,0|w0,1〉 − 〈w0,0|w′0,1〉 =4cp/s c
s
(1− 〈w0,0|w0,1〉) (12)
where c = cos(2θ), s = sin(2θ) and we write x =q y if
|x − y| ≤ q. A partial result can already be derived from
what we have so far. By equation 4, we note that the length
of the primed w vectors is at most 2
√
p. Inserting this to
equations 10 and 11, we get that |〈w0,0|w1,1〉| and similarly
|〈w0,1|w1,0〉| are close to 1 up to terms of order √p. This
is a weaker than the result which we want to achieve in
lemma 11, which is closeness to 1 up to order p terms. If
we stop here, the closeness of the unprimed w vectors up to
order
√
p implies that Bob’s information is at most of the
order of 4
√
p. Note, however, that so far all we have used is
unitarity, and we have not used the particular properties of
the set of vectors we use in the protocol. In the rest of the
proof, we will use the symmetry in protocol 1 to improve on
this partial result, and to show that Bob’s information is at
most of the order of
√
p. Basically, the symmetry which we
will use is the fact that the vectors in the protocol can be
paired into orthogonal vectors.
We proceed as follows. The idea is to express equations 9-
12 as inequalities involving only the distances between two
w vectors, ||wb,x − wb′,x′ || and then to solve the set of the
four inequalities to give an upper bound on the pairwise
distances. This will imply a bound on the inner products,
〈wb,x|wb′,x′〉, by the following connection:
Claim 12. 1−Re(〈wb,x|wb′,x′〉) ≥ ||wb,x−wb′,x′ ||
2
2
.
where Re(z) denotes the real part of the complex number z.
Proof. ||wb,x − wb′,x′ ||2 = 〈wb,x−wb′,x′ |wb,x−wb′,x′〉 ≤
2− 2Re(〈wb,x|wb′,x′〉).
We denote:
a = ||w0,0 −w0,1||
b = ||w0,0 −w1,1||
c = ||w0,1 −w1,0||
d = ||w1,0 −w1,1||
Let LHS (RHS) be the sum of the left (right) hand side of
the last four equations.
Claim 13. Re(RHS) ≥ c
2s
(a2 + d2) + s
2c
(b2 + c2).
Proof.
Re(RHS) =
c
s
(2−Re(〈w0,0|w0,1〉)−Re(〈w1,0|w1,1〉))
+
s
c
(2−Re(〈w0,0|w1,1〉)−Re(〈w0,1|w1,0〉))
and now we can apply claim 12.
Expressing the left hand side of the equations in terms of
a, b, c and d might look a bit more complicated, and this is
where we invoke the symmetric properties of the protocol,
namely equations 7 and 8.
Claim 14. Re(LHS) ≤ 4√p(a+ b+ c+ d)
Proof. We first look at the LHS of Equation 11 + Equa-
tion 12. By adding 〈w0,1|w′1,1〉 + 〈w′0,1|w1,1〉 = 0 (due
to Equation 8) and by using the fact that Re(〈α|β〉) =
Re(〈β|α〉) we get that the LHS of these two equations con-
tributes Re(〈w′0,0|w0,1 − w1,1) + Re(〈w′0,1|w1,1 − w0,0) +
Re(〈w′1,1|w0,1 −w0,0) ≤ 2√p(c+ d) + 2√pb+ 2√pa.
Similarly, the LHS of Equation 9 +Equation 10
is Re(〈w′1,0|w0,1 − w1,1) + Re(〈w′0,1|w1,0 − w1,1) +
Re(〈w′1,1|w1,0 −w0,1) ≤ 2√p(a+ b+ d+ c).
Altogether, Re(LHS) ≤ 4√p(a+ b+ c+ d).
Combining Claims 14 and 13 with our knowledge that
Re(RHS) ≤ Re(LHS) + 8cp
s
+ 8sp
c
we get:
c
2s
(a2 + d2) +
s
2c
(b2 + c2) ≤
4
√
p(a+ b+ c+ d) +
8cp
s
+
8sp
c
We want to show that a, b, c, d are all of the order of
√
p.
Define ∆ = a+ b + c+ d. For 0 ≤ θ ≤ π
8
, ctg(2θ) ≥ tg(2θ).
Since all terms in the left hand side are positive, we have for
each of a, b, c, d an upper bound in terms of ∆:
a2, b2, c2, d2 ≤ 8∆
√
p
s/c
+ 16p(1 + (
c
s
)2)
Thus, ∆ = a+ b+ c+ d ≤ 4
√
8∆
√
pc
s
+ 16p
s2
.
Solving the quadratic equation
∆2 − 2
7√pc
s
∆ − 2
8p
s2
≤ 0
for ∆ we get
∆ ≤ 132 · √p · ctg(2θ)
Finally,
|〈w0,0|w1,1〉| ≥ |Re(〈w0,0|w1,1〉)|
=
||w0,0||2 + ||w1,1||2 − b2
2
≥ 2− b
2 − 8p
2
≥ 1− (215ctg2(2θ) + 4)p
where the third inequality is true due to equation 6. Simi-
larly, we have the same lower bound for |〈w0,1|w1,0〉|, which
implies lemma 11.
Thus, our bit escrow protocol gives quadratic sealing.
Remark 1. Protocol 1 is sealing even if we modify it a
little bit, as follows: at revealing time Alice first reveals b
and then Bob returns the qubit q. In other words, if Bob has
learned ǫ information about b after the deposit stage, then
even if later on he gets to know b, he cannot avoid being
detected with probability Ω(ǫ2). To see this, we use linearity.
If Bob has a strategy which gives him detection probability p
in the modified protocol, then w.l.o.g. his strategy is to apply
the identity if b = 0 and some unitary operation U if b = 1.
However, since the b = 1, x = 0 and b = 1, x = 1 cases are
linear combinations of the b = 0, x = 0 and b = 0, x = 1
cases, one can show that if Bob’s probability for detection is
p in the b = 0 case, then it is also O(p) in the b = 1 case,
and therefore Bob does not have to apply U in the first place.
This means that if he has a cheating strategy for the modified
protocol, then he also has a cheating strategy with about the
same parameters for protocol 1, and so by Theorem 10 the
modified protocol is also quadratically secure.
Remark 2. One might suspect that this quadratic gap
will always be the case for any reasonable set of vectors for
Alice. This is not correct. If Alice only uses φ0,1 and φ1,0,
then Bob has a strategy which gives him 4
√
p advantage. We
will not elaborate on this in this paper.
4.2 A Quadratic Strategy for Bob
Theorem 15. Let ρ0, ρ1 be two density matrices of the
same dimension, such that ‖ρ0 − ρ1‖t = t. Consider the
following protocol. Alice tosses a random bit b. She chooses
a pure state from the mixture ρb, and sends it to Bob. Then
Bob returns to Alice the state, and Alice projects it on the
original state to test whether Bob has manipulated it. We
claim that for any 1 ≥ p ≥ 0, there is a strategy for Bob such
that he learns b with advantage t
√
p, and his probability of
detection is at most 1
2
(1−√1− p), which is Θ(p) for small
p.
proof: Alice prepares an encoding ψb of b ∈ {0, 1} in register
B, and sends register B to Bob. Let ρb be the reduced den-
sity matrix of ψb to register B. We denote t = ||ρ0 − ρ1||t.
By Theorem 3 we know that if Bob is interested in learn-
ing information about b, and is not concerned with being
detected cheating, the best he can do is a measurement
according to the eigenvalue basis of ρ0 − ρ1. Given, any
0 ≤ p ≤ 1 we modify this strategy to a strategy where the
detection probability is at most p, and yet, Bob gets much
information.
Let us consider more precisely Bob’s best strategy for
learning b if he is not concerned with being caught. Let
{e1, . . . , eK} be the eigenvector basis of ρ0 − ρ1. Let V +
(V −) be the set of eigenvectors e with non-negative (neg-
ative) eigenvalues. The measurement M is defined by the
Hermitian matrix for which V + is an eigenspace of eigen-
value 0 and V − is an eigenspace of eigenvalue 1. By Theo-
rem 3
|Trace(ρ0M)− Trace(ρ1M)| = t
2
(13)
To apply a weak form of the measurement M , Bob takes a
one qubit ancilla C. He applies a unitary transformation U
on the received message and the ancilla, as follows:
U |e, 0〉 =
{ |e, 0〉 If e ∈ V +
|e〉 ⊗ |v〉 If e ∈ V −
where |v〉 = √1− p|0〉+√p|1〉 and U is completed to a uni-
tary transformation. After applying U Bob returns register
B to Alice, and keeps the ancilla C for himself. Notice that
the special case p = 1 is equivalent to the measurement M .
Lemma 16. ||Uρ0|C − Uρ1|C ||t = t√p.
Proof. We will show
Claim 17.
Uρ0|C = Trace(ρ0M)|0〉〈0|+ (1− Trace(ρ0M))|v〉〈v|)
Uρ1|C = Trace(ρ1M)|0〉〈0|+ (1− Trace(ρ1M))|v〉〈v|)
Thus, Uρ0|C − Uρ1|C = (Trace(ρ0M) −
Trace(ρ1M))(|0〉〈0| − |v〉〈v|) = ± t2 (|0〉〈0| − |v〉〈v|),
where the last equality is due to Equation 13. Since,
|||0〉〈0| − |v〉〈v|||t = 2
√
1− 〈0|v〉|2 = 2√p we get
||Uρ0|C − Uρ1|C ||t = t√p as desired.
We now prove Claim 17.
Proof. (of Claim 17). We express ρ0 =
∑
j wj |αj〉〈αj |,
where αj is a pure state.We further express each αj in the
eigenbasis {ei}:
|αj〉 =
∑
i+
a+ij |e+i 〉+
∑
i−
a−ij |e−i 〉
Applying U , this state is taken to:
U |αj , 0〉 =
∑
i+
a+ij |e+i 〉|0〉+
∑
i−
a−ij |e−i 〉|v〉
The reduced density matrix to the register C, in case of
event |αj〉 is:∑
i+ |a+ij |2|0〉〈0|+
∑
i− |a−ij |2|v〉〈v|
and altogether, Uρ0|C =
∑
j wj(
∑
i+ |a+ij |2)|0〉〈0|+∑
j wj(
∑
i− |a−ij |2)|v〉〈v|. To complete the proof we just no-
tice that
∑
j wj(
∑
i+ |a+ij |2) = Trace(ρ0M). The proof for
Uρ0|C is similar.
We now analyze the error detection probability.
Lemma 18. Prob(err) ≤ 1
2
(1−√1− p)
Proof. Say Alice sent Bob the state |w〉. We can express
it as |w〉 = a|w+〉 + b|w−〉 where |w+〉 ∈ Span(V +) and
|w−〉 ∈ Span(V −). Bob applies U on w and gets
U |w〉 = a|w+, 0〉+ b|w−, v〉
= a|w+, 0〉+
√
1− pb|w−, 0〉+√pb|w−, 1〉
Therefore, if we measure the last qubit, then with proba-
bility pb2 we end up in |w−〉 and with probability 1 − pb2
we end up in a|w+〉 + √1− pb|w−〉 normalized. Thus the
density matrix of U |w〉 after tracing out the last qubit is:
ρ =
( |a|2 ba¯√1− p
b¯a
√
1− p |b|2
)
To find out the probability for Alice not to detect Bob cheat-
ing, we calculate 〈w|ρ|w〉. We get:
Pr(¬Err) = |a|4 + 2|ab|2
√
1− p+ |b|4
= 1− 2|ab|2(1−
√
1− p)
The probability of Alice detecting an error is thus 2|ab|2(1−√
1− p) ≤ 1
2
(1−√1− p).
Remark 3. The average of |ab| can tend to 0.5, even
when t tends to 0. This can be seen by taking ρ0 to be com-
posed of two states which are the basis states |0〉 and |1〉
rotated by θ towards each other, whereas ρ1 is the mixture
of the basis states rotated by θ outwards. As θ tends to 0, t
tends to 0, but |ab| tend to 0.5.
5. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We show that no cheater can control the game.
When Bob cheats :
Suppose Alice is honest and Bob is arbitrary. Let us
look at the mixture that Alice generates at the first
step of Protocol 2. Let ρb=0 be the density matrix in
the case b = 0, and ρb=1 in the case b = 1. Then
||ρb=0 − ρb=1||t = 2 cos(2θ). It follows from Theorem
3 that whatever Bob does, the probability that b′ = b
and Bob wins is at most Pr(b′ = b) ≤ 1
2
+ cos(2θ)
2
=
cos2(θ) which for θ = π
8
is at most 0.86.
When Alice cheats :
Now, suppose Bob is honest and Alice is arbitrary.
Prob(Alice wins ) = x, which is at most p0+q1
2
,
whereas the probability that Alice loses is at least
p1+q0
2
. The difference |x − (1 − x)| is at most
p0−q0+q1−p1
2
≤ |p0−q0|+|p1−q1|
2
= |p0 − q0|, i.e., x ≤
1+|p0−q0|
2
.
Also, perr+qerr
2
≤ 1 − x, as whenever Alice is caught
cheating she loses. This implies that
√
perr +
√
qerr ≤
2
√
1− x as the maximum is obtained when perr =
qerr = 1− x.
Finally, from the proof of Theorem 5 we have |p0 −
q0| ≤
√
perr+
√
qerr
cos(2θ)
. Putting it all together we get:
x ≤ 1 + |p0 − q0|
2
≤ 1
2
+
√
perr +
√
qerr
2cos(2θ)
≤ 1
2
+
√
1− x
cos(2θ)
For θ = π
8
we get the quadratic equation 4x2+4x−7 ≤
0. Solving it we get x ≤
√
8−1
2
≤ 0.9143.
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